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Forthcoming in Politics, 2016. 
Using focus groups to 
study everyday narratives 
in world politics 
Liam Stanley 
University of Sheffield 
Abstract: Following widespread use in political marketing and polling, focus groups are 
slowly gaining recognition as a useful and legitimate method in political science. Focus groups 
can however be far more than just a secondary qualitative method to primary quantitative 
public opinion research: they can be used to study the micro-level process of social 
construction. The process in which key sub-groups collectively contest and justify the actions 
of elite political actors via shared values is one way to study how legitimacy is conferred. This 
article therefore argues that focus groups can be particularly useful for research that examines 
everyday narratives in world politics. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Legitimation is one of the perennial questions of political science. Whether implicit or 
explicit, there is a wealth of research that asks questions about how the powerful 
successfully obfuscate their actions, how social systems are maintained in spite of the 
manifest injustices they produce, why the public accept or resist contentious political 
change, and so on. One mechanism through which power is legitimated is the extent to 
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which it is justifiable in light of shared values. Political elites use a number of tools at 
their disposal ± including rhetoric and political ideas ± in order to convince the public 
that their rule is just. This brings us to the prickly question of audience and the specific 
puzzle of how and why ideas resonate with the public. Why do certain political ideas 
³ZRUN´LQMXVWLI\LQJSRZHU":K\GRVRPHVRDUDQGRWKHUVIDOO"'HVSLWHthere being an 
endless number of ways to chip away at this puzzle, this article argues that using focus 
groups to study everyday narratives provides a particularly useful tool for doing so. As 
Steiner Kvale asks: ³If you want to know how people understand their world and their 
lives, why not talk to them?´ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. xvii). 
This is despite focus groups¶ strange reputation. The method ± typically defined as 
³structured discussions among 6 to 10 homogenous strangers in a formal setting´ 
(Morgan, 1996, p. 131) ± is sometimes associated more closely with the shadowy 
techniques of corporate and political marketing than it is as a legitimate social science 
method (Parker and Tritter, 2006, p. 23; Savigny, 2007). This is accentuated by the 
methodological conventional wisdom of the discipline. The method continues to be 
viewed through the lens of quantitative public opinion research, i.e., aggregating 
individual preferences and attitudes from a systematically random sample in order to 
extrapolate about a wider population. If the aim is to study public opinion in this way, 
then focus groups will almost inevitably be negatively evaluated ± downgraded from a 
primary method to one that must be supplementary to quantitative counterparts (e.g., 
Copsey, 2008). Yet despite the conventional wisdom, there are numerous examples of 
focus groups as a primary method in research about politics (e.g. Gamson, 1992; Hopf, 
2002; Marsh, O'Toole and Jones, 2007; Jarvis and Lister, 2012). These studies 
appreciate that the purpose of focus group research is to understand how a particular 
population or group process and negotiate meaning around a given situation. This is a 
worthwhile aim that cannot be easily achieved, if at all, with quantitative methods. 
Consequently, this article does not provide a practical how-to guide for organising and 
facilitating focus groups. Instead, it unpacks one particular methodology for using 
focus groups to study everyday narratives in world politics. My starting point is to 
challenge the assumed association between focus groups and those methodologies 
associated with quantitative public opinion research. As an alternative methodological 
grounding, I propose a Weberian approach whereby the practical and ³analytical 
order[ing] of empirical social reality´ (Weber, 1949, p. 63) is the central aim of 
scholarship. This foundational assumption of intersubjectivity has proximity with the 
standard theoretical assumptions of focus groups. Proponents of the method are usually 
interested in analysing intersubjectivity ± the common-sense conceptions and ordinary 
explanations shared by a set of social actors (Calder, 1977, p. 358). Focus groups 
produce ³sociable public discourse´ in which participants tend to act as if ³speaking to 
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a gallery´ governed by the norms of public discourse (Gamson, 1992, p. 20). By 
carefully sampling salient sub-groups, the shared values drawn upon to justify political 
change can be reconstructed and analysed as an ideal-type everyday narrative. This can 
in turn inform us about how political change instigated at an elite level is conferred a 
degree of legitimacy. 
In unpacking this approach the article argues that quantitative public opinion 
methodologies are counterproductive to focus group research. To get the most out of 
focus groups, researchers must reflect upon, rather than necessarily strictly adopt, a 
number of ostensibly radical methodological moves. These moves may seem jarring in 
comparison to the supposedly conventional methodologies of political science and 
international relations. Yet, without them, focus groups lose the majority of their added 
value. The threat is that the method will be consigned to a secondary role, answerable 
in principle and practice to quantitative studies in which collective meaning making is 
lost. The methodology outlined in this article is hopefully one way this fate can be 
avoided, but, to be clear, it is not the only way.  
The article is divided into four main sections. The first situates the methodology within 
its intellectual heritage, namely, a critique of the theory of legitimation implicit in 
much constructivist and institutionalist literature. By reconceptualising legitimacy as a 
two-way process, we can analysis how political action and ideas are conferred 
legitimation via justification in line with shared values. The second section outlines a 
Weberian approach to the nature of scholarly knowledge. Section three introduces the 
key theoretical assumption of intersubjectivity. This provides the basis for theorising 
focus group interactions, the process of collective meaning making, appropriate 
sampling strategies, and the sorts of knowledge claims that can be made from the 
subsequent data. Section four highlights the practical implications of this methodology. 
Here, I draw upon my own focus group research to illustrate how this methodology 
may be implemented in practice. Finally, I conclude the article by calling to extend the 
reflexive turn beyond ontology to also concern the practical links between method and 
methodology.   
3ROLWLFDOLGHDVDQGWKHSUREOHPRIOHJLWLPDF\ 
Over the last twenty years or so political scientists have started to systematically 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHWKHUROHRI³LGHDV´LQH[SODLQLQJSROLWLFDOFKDQJH, with constructivist or 
discursive institutionalism one of the most popular of these approaches (Hay, 2006; 
Schmidt, 2008). These approaches explain political outcomes through the constellation 
of ideas and institutions. As in traditional forms of institutionalism, actors are still 
constrained and enabled by their context. But discursive institutionalism places agency 
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at the foreground. Actors can use ideas to create and alter institutions, as well as use 
those ideas to communicate and legitimise that institutional change or continuity. 
Although not at the forefront, the approach does conceptualise how ideas might 
resonate with the public. Both Schmidt and Campbell theorise how the ideas used by 
politicians to make sense of an issue and then justify particular action must resonate 
with ³public philosophies´ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306) or ³public sentiments´ (Campbell, 
1998, p. 385). However, neither author offers concrete empirical strategies for 
exploring these issues. The question therefore remains: how and why do ideas resonate 
with the public? Questioning and theorising about the process of legitimation offers a 
potential key.  
Leonard Seabrooke (2006) argues that this literature possesses a flawed but implicit 
underlying theory of legitimation. The approach assumes ³auto-legitimacy´, whereby 
elite narratives and the various social relations they underpin are assumed to 
unproblematically gain legitimacy ³by proclamation´ (2006, p. 40). Although not the 
primary focus of these approaches, this underlying theory of legitimacy-by-
proclamation also implicitly claims that the public are the passive referents and 
recipients of elite legitimation claims (Seabrooke, 2006, p. 22). Although the 
legitimacy-by-proclamation thesis is a direct critique of this literature, it reflects a 
conventional wisdom about legitimacy: that is, the notion that legitimation is conferred 
through those without power having the perception that the actions of the powerful are 
legitimate (Beetham, 1991, p. 6-19). The result of this formulation is an underlying 
theory that focuses on how legitimation claims help propagate ³perceptions of 
legitimacy´ or the ³construction of legitimacy´, with little reflection on whether the 
legitimation claims in question have worked in convincing or coercing the audience of 
the justness or necessity of the action in question. The modern incarnation of this view 
is perhaps to be found in the popularity of survey research in social sciences, in which 
an aggregation of individual beliefs and preferences in favour of a certain system or a 
particular policy is sometimes provided as evidence of legitimacy.  
David Beetham (1991) argues that this has a deleterious impact upon how legitimation 
is analysed. Scholars assume that if people believe in the legitimacy of those with 
power1 then it must be because the powerful have managed to convince or trick people 
that they are legitimate. The question of legitimacy is therefore placed in the hands of 
the powerful themselves, without appreciating hRZWKHSURFHVVLVE\GHILQLWLRQD³WZR-
ZD\ VWUHHW´ (Seabrooke, 2006, p. 9). The central mistake in the belief-in-legitimacy 
WKHRU\LVWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQSHRSOH¶VLQGLYLGXDOEHOLHIVDERXWOHJLWLPDF\IURPWKH
                                                 
1
 Although many scholars who study the process of legitimation focus on the authority of the state in the 
context of relations with society, WKHUH LV QR REYLRXV UHDVRQ ZK\ WKH VRUW RI ³SRZHU´ discussed here 
cannot be extended to other forms of social relations. 
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intersubjective grounds or reasons for holding them in the first place (Beetham, 1991, 
p. 10). Unlike perceptions, these are not found in the aggregated individual minds of 
people but in the shared values of a society or social groups (Beetham, 1991, p. 10).  
In place of the legitimacy-by-proclamation thesis, Beetham authoritatively claims that 
³a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, 
but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs´ (Beetham, 1991, p. 11). As 
Beetham (1991, p. 11) explains in more detail: 
This may seem like a fine distinction, but it is a fundamental one. When we seek to 
assess the legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other power relation, one 
WKLQJZHDUHGRLQJLVDVVHVVLQJKRZIDULWFDQEHMXVWLILHGLQWHUPVRISHRSOH¶VEHOLHIV
how far it conforms to their values or standards, how far it satisfies the normative 
expectations they have of it. We are making an assessment of the degree of congruence, 
or lack of it, between a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations 
that provide its justificDWLRQ :H DUH QRW PDNLQJ D UHSRUW RQ SHRSOH¶V EHOLHI LQ LWV
legitimacy. 
If a set of social relations can be conferred legitimacy when they can be justified in line 
with shared values, then DV VRFLHW\¶V FRQYHQWLRQV ZD[ DQG ZDQH VR WRR GRHV WKH
legitimation of authority (Beetham, 1991, p. 11). Consequently, legitimacy is recast as 
a process rather than a classification, which runs on a spectrum as opposed via a binary 
condition.  
This formulation of legitimation has important implications. For one, it suggests that 
the power of ideas cannot be reduced to the ³means of power available to those who 
control their dissemination´, but should be ³measured´ in terms of their credibility to 
the recipient (Beetham, 1991, p. 106). In other words, the actions or ideas of elites are 
not legitimate because those with power say so ± an example of the legitimacy-by-
proclamation thesis ± but because those actions or ideas can be justified in light of 
shared values. Since focus groups are a particularly useful way of exposing and 
analysing shared values, the method fits with this theory of legitimacy. Before we get 
to the detail of the method itself, we must begin with some fundamental 
methodological questions regarding the sort of knowledge we are aiming to generate.  
$:HEHULDQDSSURDFK 
Political scientists are increasingly acknowledging that all social science is 
underpinned by a number of unsolvable assumptions about the nature of being and 
knowing (Hay, 2002; Bates and Jenkins, 2007; Stanley, 2012). There can be therefore 
no one right way of doing social science. Whatever means are being utilised to achieve 
whatever epistemic ends, both those means and ends should be fully justified. In this 
vein, the aim of this section is not to outline substantive theoretical assumptions about 
the make-up of the world or how best to specifically collect or analyse data. Instead it 
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aims to outline the most basic principles that underpin the design and data collection of 
this methodology. This is especially important when such values deviate considerably 
from the mainstream. 
My methodological starting point is :HEHU¶V observation that social science is 
inherently value-laden (Weber, 1946). This statement invokes at more than one 
meaning. For one, it suggests WKDWD³QHXWUDO´ VRFLDO VFLHQFH LV LPSRVVLEOHGXH WR WKH
inescapable values of the researcher and that there is no objectively correct or right 
way to produce social scientific knowledge. Yet, :HEHU¶VVWDWHPHQWFDQDOVREHUHDGLQ
a third way, namely, that social science is value-laden because the very definition of 
social scientific knowledge is itself contested. To be ³scientific´ should be separated 
from adhering to the values of the common-sense standard of (in this particular case) 
quantitative public opinion research. In ensuring a fair evaluation of scientific 
knowledge, the only criteria we can propose then is the internal validity of 
methodology for systematically producing facts (Jackson, 2010, p. 22-24). 
*XDUDQWHHLQJWKLVLQWXUQPHDQVEHLQJXSIURQWDERXWRQH¶VIRXQGDWLRQDODVVXPSWLRQV
and the basis on which empirical claims are based.  
The methodology outlined here rejects the object/subject distinction, and therefore 
foregrounds the intersubjective nature of crafting scholarly knowledge itself. In regard 
to this latter concern, the philosophical starting point is that all observations, scholarly 
or otherwise, are dependent upon theories and concepts. As a result, we cannot make a 
meaningful distinctioQEHWZHHQ³NQRZLQJ´DQG³EHLQJ´; or, LQ5RGQH\%DUNHU¶V(2000) 
WHUPV ³WKLQNLQJ´ and ³GRLQJ´ This runs contrary to the orthodoxy of the discipline 
(Barker, 2000, p. 223-4), whereby it is typically assumed that there is a distinction 
between object and subject, and therefore scholarly knowledge should be judged on its 
ability to represent an external reality. This may appear as common sense, and, in a 
way, that is exactly the point. 
Yet this perspective can and has been successfully challenged since even before the 
inception of social science (on which, see Jackson, 2010). Although there is not space 
to review these disputes fully, the rejection of a split between knowing and being often 
begins with restating that µthere is no way of getting outside the concepts in terms of 
which we think of the world « The world is for us what is presented through those 
concepts¶(Winch, 1958, p. 15). With this mind, we must question the extent to which 
we FDQZHHYHU ³DFFHVV´ DQ H[WHUQDO UHDOLW\ on which to judge how well knowledge 
represents reality if we assume that the world is mediated through concepts. From this 
foundation, we can envisage a different set of methodological values to those that are 
typically associated with quantitative public opinion research. Here, what really 
matters when producing scholarly knowledge is the useful ³analytical order[ing] of 
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empirical social reality´ (Weber, 1949, p. 63). This Weberian approach therefore seeks 
to order the experiences from practical research activity through crafting analytical 
narratives ± involving the deliberate over-simplification of ideal-typical concepts in 
exploring historical contingencies ± to make empirical claims with ³pragmatic 
explanatory utility´ (Jackson, 2010, p. 37).  
,W LV LOOXVWUDWLYH WR WXUQ WR:HEHU¶VH[SODQDWLRQRI LGHDO-types to get a better grasp of 
this methodology: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found 
empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia (Weber, 1949, p. 90). 
This quote is worth fleshing out. Due to the ³infinite richness of events´ (1949, p. 111), 
all explanations are by definition imperfect. This is what, in part, makes science so 
value-laden, because all scholars are forced to focus on just a relatively limited aspect 
of explaining a historical event equating to their specialism and interests (Weber, 1949, 
p. 71). All explanations are necessarily one-sided or, more accurately perhaps, 
selective. However, an explanation may also be ³free from the charge of arbitrariness 
to the extent that it is successful in producing insights into interconnections which have 
been shown to be valuable for the causal explanation of concrete historical events´ 
(Weber, 1949, p. 71).  
This methodology looks to isolate ideal-typical factors that can adequately account, 
causally speaking, for a historical event through counterfactual reasoning. These 
analytical ³concept-constructions´ (Weber, 1949, p. 101) are not supposed to be 
³tested´ by comparing them to reality, because, as Weber makes clear in his use of 
³utopia´, they cannot be found. The only way they can be judged is as means to an end. 
As Patrick Jackson explains, the only meaningful way to evaluate such constructs is 
pragmatically: ³that is, to examine whether, once applied, the ideal type is efficacious 
in revealing intriguing and useful things about the objects to which it is applied´ (2010, 
p. 146). Such explanations should be judged as valid to the extent that ³our 
imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as µobjectively possible¶ and 
which appear as adequate´ (Weber, 1949, p. 92). The end, in this particular case, is a 
concrete analysis of the role of everyday narratives in legitimating change in a case 
study within world politics. 
)RFXVJURXSUHVHDUFKLQWKHRU\ 
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This section builds on the Weberian approach from the previous section by fleshing out 
some of the detail regarding how focus groups can be used to make knowledge claims 
about the legitimating function of everyday narratives in world politics. This includes 
discussion of what sort of knowledge focus groups can produce, the theoretical 
assumptions that underlie this, and the type of sampling strategies appropriate to this 
methodology. It therefore outlines some guidance over what can be ³accessed´ with 
focus group interviews, and the extent to which claims can be made beyond just the 
specific participants interviewed. The notion of intersubjectivity intersects all of these 
concerns.  
Before conducting focus group research, one must decide what we are aiming to 
³access´ via a focus group. Kvale and Brinkmann¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHLQWHUYLHZer 
as a miner or as a traveller illustrates two contrasting ideal-types for interviewing. 
:KLOH WKH PLQHU¶V DLP LV knowledge collection WKH WUDYHOOHU¶V DLP LV knowledge 
construction (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 48). For the miner, knowledge is 
understood to lie in the minds of interview participants. It is thus akin to ³buried 
metal´; something that lies in a potentially deep interior for the interviewer to unearth 
as cleanly as possible (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 48). The interviewer ³digs 
QXJJHWVRINQRZOHGJHRXWRIDVXEMHFW¶VSXUHH[SHULHQFHVXQSROOXWHGE\DQ\ OHDGLQJ
questions [which] may be understood as objective real data or as subjective authentic 
meanings´ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 48).  
Alternatively, the traveller interviewer can be thought of as on a journey. The 
interviewer is a traveller, in line with the original Latin meaning of conversation as 
³wandering together with´, who ³talks along with the local inhabitants, asking 
questions and encouraging them to tell their own stories of their lived world´ (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 48). Knowledge, then, is not merely discovered in or mined 
from the minds of people. It is instead actively created through the process of questions 
and answers; the product of interviewer and interviewee (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, 
p. 54). It is for these reasons that Kvale (2009, p. 2) describes the interview as literally 
an inter-view: ³an inter-change of views between two persons conversing about a 
theme of mutual interest´ .  
These categories of miner and traveller highlight the different theoretical approaches 
that can be taken to interviewing. An interview or focus group that is driven by the 
assumptions of quantitative public opinion research may seek to create a ³pure´ 
interview (Hollander, 2004, p. 611; Munday, 2006, p. 95). A Weberian approach that 
foregrounds the intersubjectivity of both scholarly knowledge and of the social world 
will be more comfortable with (if not actually encouraging of) the use of ³familiar 
narrative constructs´ in the place of seemingly genuine beliefs in the minds of people 
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(Miller and Glassner, 2004, p. 125-7). As a result, the interview can provide insights 
beyond just the individual and instead provide knowledge about the intersubjectivity of 
sub-groups too. Indeed, ³all knowledge is seen as dependent on the social context of its 
production [which] also points in the direction of actively including the social 
interaction´, rather than worrying about biases and cross-contamination of individual 
beliefs (Halkier, 2010, p. 74). 
The mining metaphor reflects the assumption of intersubjectivity, whereby the shared 
norms and meanings of specific sub-groups is the central unit of analysis. As Bobby 
Calder recounts in his seminal article on focus groups, intersubjectivity ³refers to the 
common-sense conceptions and ordinary explanations shared by a set of social actors´ 
(1977, p. 358). This is exactly why the focus group literature talks of ³how people 
construct and reconstruct their stories´ (Barbour, 2007, p. 42) or ³the processes 
whereby meaning is collectively constructed´ (Bryman, 2008, p. 476). The collective 
element goes hand-in-hand in intersubjectivity, and is an advantage focus groups have 
over individual interviews. As Gamson recounts, focus groups represent ³sociable 
public discourse´ in which participants tend to act as if ³speaking to a gallery´ 
whereby the norms of public discourse constrain and enable discussion (Gamson, 1992, 
p. 20). The clear value added of focus groups lies in their ability through sustained 
³retrospective introspection´ to reveal previously taken for granted assumptions that 
underpin our rarely articulated but common sense stock of knowledge (Bloor,  et al., 
2001, p. 5). 
But where, exactly, do these meanings come from? How are they shared? And who 
shares them? Calder (1977, p. 358) points out that a key factor in intersubjectivity is 
³WKHDFWRU¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWRWKHUVVHHWKHZRUOGLQWKHVDPHZD\«,QWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\
is thus defined socially, not individually´. Intersubjectivity is thus closely related to 
common patterns of socialisation: ³The key variable is the degree of personal contact 
and similarity of socialisation, which is basic to all social groupings, such as those 
based on social class, geographic location, race, or whatever´ (Calder, 1977, p. 358). 
This has two important implications for sampling strategy.  
First, if we assume that intersubjectivity is dependent on socialisation (similar 
upbringing, similar experiences), and that focus groups are being used to study 
intersubjectivity, then it is crucial that focus group participants share a number of key 
characteristics. This is the reason the focus group literature consistently recommends 
using ³homogenous´ participants (e.g. Morgan, 1996, p. 131; 1997, p. 35; Krueger and 
Casey, 2000, p. 10; Wilkinson, 2004, p. 179). Second, with intersubjectivity as the key 
level of analysis, we then must decide which and whose intersubjectivity we are to 
study. Therefore it makes sense to sample ³theoretically´ (sometimes also called 
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³purposefully´ or ³paradigmatically´): that is, ³theorising ± albeit at an early stage ± 
about the dimensions that are likely to be relevant in terms of giving rise to differing 
perceptions or experiences´ (Barbour, 2007, p. 58). I return to this issue briefly in the 
next section.  
Recall that a degree of legitimacy is conferred when elite actions or ideas can be 
justified via shared values. This notion of shared values must be disaggregated in order 
to operationalise it for research. :LOOLDP *DPVRQ¶V (1992) Talking Politics is a 
particular inspiration here. In the discussion of his study into how working people 
negotiate and discuss politics, Gamson urges us to think of each political issue ³as a 
forest through which people must find their way´ with various cultural sources 
providing ³maps indicating useful points of entry [and] signposts at various crossroads´ 
(Gamson, 1992, p. 117). Gamson then categorises these ³maps´ as originating from 
one of three possible sources: the media, popular wisdom, and everyday experiences. 
Given the limitations of the focus group method, the latter two of these sources are the 
most important to unpack.  
7KH VHFRQG RI *DPVRQ¶V VRXUFHV LQ HYHU\GD\ VHQVH-making is popular wisdom. 
Popular wisdom refers to taken-for-granted knowledge and maxims that are often used 
to make a point in conversation and are reliant upon the assumptions that are shared. 
The shared aspect is important since popular wisdom depends on those very basic and 
IRXQGDWLRQDOEHOLHIVDQGDVVXPSWLRQVWKDWµHYHU\RQH¶NQRZV+RZHYHU³the greater the 
degree of homogeneity of life experience among a group of people, the greater the 
popular wisdom available to them as a resource´ (1992, p. 123-4). More specifically, 
popular wisdom is often utilised through (1) rules of thumb and (2) analogies to 
everyday life situations (Gamson, 1992, p. 124; for examples see Stanley, 2014).  
7KH WKLUGRI*DPVRQ¶V VRXUFHV LQ HYHU\GD\ sense-making is experiential knowledge. 
Gamson found that people frequently made points in his focus groups ³by telling a 
story´ (Gamson, 1992, p. 122). While these stories were sometimes from secondary 
sources such as from television or from a newspaper, the majority of the anecdotes 
were about themselves or at least someone that they know personally (Gamson, 1992, 
p. 122). More specifically, experiential knowledge is often utilised through emblematic 
anecdotes that seek to make a broader point about how the world works (Gamson 
1992: 122). Experiences in the form of anecdotes have a privileged place in 
conversation. Although experiential knowledge relies less on sharedness and is thus 
unique to the individual, it can still be important in collective meaning making ± 
especially when participants sometimes offer corroborating stories.  
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To summarise up to this point, political elites use ideas to justify and make space for 
political change or to maintain the status quo. Yet, most political elites, to differing 
extents, are not merely speaking in a vacuum in which their actions are conferred 
automatic legitimacy. Legitimation is a two-way street, between those in formal 
positions of power and everyday actors. Beetham identified justifiability as one key 
mechanism of legitimation: the extent to which political change can be justified in light 
of shared values. If facing challenges to their legitimacy, governments may intervene 
with policies or discourses that seek to assuage the public. By promising to, say, make 
life fairer through means that can be justified by shared values, they can begin to halt 
the erosion of their legitimation. Focus groups are of particular use here. By analysing 
the sociable public discourse they produce, we can reconstruct ideal-type everyday 
narratives based on shared values that illuminate the process of legitimation.  
Narrative analysis can be used to highlight the intersubjective bases of these 
justifications. Since shared values allow individuals to comprehend and organise 
experience, we can look for patterns across different instances of everyday talk from 
similar people for evidence of such shared and stable understandings (Quinn, 2005, p. 
40-43). ³In general´, according to Claudia Strauss, one should ³take what your 
interviewees say and consider what else they have to assume for those statements to 
make sense´ (2005, p. 208) 7KH DLP LV WKXV WR ³SHHO EDFN´ IURP WKH FDFRSKRQ\ RI
everyday talk to the shared values that make those justifications possible. Narrative 
analysis, in particular, reconstructs the stories told during interviews or focus groups 
through working out the key players and a basic structure or plot (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009, p. 222). If these stories may not be told explicitly then a coherent 
narrative can be constructed from different elements and points made throughout the 
interview (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 222). Just like how when someone tells a 
story it always has a point, when someone discusses one topic in connection with 
another (even without any explanation for the connection) they take for granted the 
norms and conventions that link those topics (Strauss, 2005, p. 208). We can call this 
the assumption of contiguity: ³if topic B follows topic A when a speaker is allowed to 
talk without interruption, then A and B are linked´ (Strauss, 2005, p. 208). The aim of 
this analysis is then to reconstruct the many tales told into a ideal-typical narrative that 
is ³a richer, more condensed and coherent story´ than the data provides alone (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 202). These narratives do not exist in the sense that they can 
be discovered because they are a form of ideal-type analysis. It is therefore important, 
where space permits, to analyse and describe alternative narratives.  
Claims about everyday narratives from focus groups can be extended beyond just the 
participants interviewed. It is important to note the differences in ³scaling up´ between 
empirical generalisability and analytical generality (Yin, 2003, p. 10). Quantitative 
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public opinion research will typically use empirical generalisability to scale up a series 
of individual preferences derived from a survey through a representative sample in 
order to make claims about a wider population. Since the level of analysis in this 
alternative methodology is not the individual, a different method is required based on 
³producing context-bound typicalities´ (Halkier, 2011, p. 788). This is where the 
Weberian ideal-type methodology and the theoretical assumptions about 
intersubjectivity and sense-making most clearly collide. The popular wisdom and 
experiences drawn on by participants are not necessarily located in their minds, but 
emerge in a form of sociable public discourse with a group of similar people (Halkier, 
2011, p. 792). We can therefore look for both agreements within each discussion and 
similarities between focus groups in order to build an ideal-type justificatory narrative. 
It is a therefore a narrative based on a type of collective experience. It is for this reason 
that using homogenous participants from a relatively specific sub-group is seen as so 
important in both focus group research more generally, and within the particular 
methodology outlined here (Fairweather and Rinne, 2012, p. 476). Claims can be 
strengthened, where possible, by corroboration with secondary data or academic 
literature. Although the epistemic basis for the claims is different (and weaker) 
compared to quantitative public opinion research, using this sort of methodology 
results in insights and analyses otherwise impossible. 
This specific methodology has two significant weaknesses that are important to flag up. 
Specifically, this form of analysis does violence to individual, subjective and 
idiosyncratic narratives by imposing a ³utopian´ order and coherence upon 
proceedings. This can be politically and ethically troublesome, because those 
subjective and idiosyncratic narratives may reflect the experiences of the 
systematically underprivileged. By excluding questions of intersectionality this sort of 
research can, in principle, be complicit in reinforcing undesirable power relations and 
the continued exclusion of marginalised experiences. Due to the logic of this 
methodology, this is difficult to counteract. Recall how intersubjectivity represents one 
of the key assumptions in the research design: instead of accessing individual beliefs, 
the aim is to analyse shared norms from specific sub-groups. In the example research 
discussed in the next section, those sub-groups do include women and ethnic minorities 
as members both abstractly and specifically within the sub-groups that were targeted. 
However, those individual marginalised experiences cannot be assumed to be typical 
of a type of experience (of, say, women). To do so would logically contradict the 
methodology outlined. To remedy this, one would need to conduct separate focus 
groups with a specific marginalised sub-group. However, this itself is often not 
possible because resources are often limited (as they were in this case). When using 
focus groups, scholars must therefore be sensitive to the variegated experiences of the 
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systematically underprivileged when space permits, and, above all, demonstrate the 
practical utility of the analytical ends despite the potentially troublesome means.   
)RFXVJURXSUHVHDUFKLQSUDFWLFH 
This section draws on a focus group research project, conducted by the author, in order 
to illuminate the methodology outlined above. The main aim of the research was to 
investigate the everyday politics of austerity in the UK and, in particular, how and why 
significant segments of the public seemed to accept implications of budget deficit 
reduction as necessary. Specifically, the project aimed to discover how members of the 
public justified austerity through holding a series of focus groups. The sampling 
strategy was theoretically driven by these concerns. Homeowners from middle-income 
areas [focus groups A1-A4] were selected as a theoretically likely group to justify 
austerity, while volunteers in impoverished areas [focus groups B5-B6] were selected 
as a theoretically likely group to oppose austerity. 
Six focus groups, with a total of 39 participants, were conducted between May and 
October 2012 (see appendix for details). The first sub-group was recruited via the 
electoral register, while the second sub-group was recruited via local advertisements 
and word of mouth. All participants were offered a £20 gift voucher as an incentive. 
The groups contained a mix of those employed in the public and private sectors ± as 
well as unemployed ± and a mix of genders and ethnicities. A limited facilitation 
approach taken by the author, meaning that questions and interventions were limited to 
allow the discussion to flow relatively freely. Towards the end of each group it was 
always asked whether they believe spending cuts in the name of austerity was 
necessary. Each discussion was recorded and transcribed verbatim. Analysis was 
conducted in NVivo.  
Within the focus groups, it was generally established that ³debt´ was one of the central 
problems facing the British economy and society. Looking over the examples of how 
each group identified debt as the problem, it is striking just how ambiguous and far-
reaching the understandings of debt are, even just in these excerpts from each focus 
group:  
Jerry: When you asked ³do we need to cut back?´«,WKLQNZHGR,WKLQNZH
KDYHDVWUXFWXUDOGHILFLWZKLFKPHDQVZH¶UHPDNLQJOHVVHYHU\\HDUVR,WKLQN
we do. I accept the argument, as much as I hate them [the government] for that. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Kyle , GRQ¶W NQRZ KRZ HOVH \RX GR LW >UHGXFH WKH GHILFLW WKURXJK VSHQGLQJ
FXWV@EHFDXVHLI\RXGRLW«WKHRQO\RWKHUZD\LVWD[DWLRQ,MXVWWKLQNLI\RX
tax us anymoUHZH¶UHDOUHDG\EOHHGLQJGU\ 
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Nicholas: I tend to agree with that. 
Linda: Yes. 
[Focus group A2] 
Sarah: I think they [the spending cuts] are necessary. 
Rachel: ,WKLQNZHQHHGWRFODZEDFNVRPHZKHUH«QRGRXEWDERXWWKDW 
Lucy: , WKLQN SUREDEO\ \HV « WKH GHILFLW VKRXOG EH SDUWO\ PDGH XS IURP
elsewhere ± like very profitable businesses. I think people who make a lot of 
money should be made to have a bit more of a social conscience.  
[Focus group A3] 
Caitlin7KH\¶UH>EDQNHUV@QRWKLQJIDQWDVWLF7KH\¶UHRQHWKHUHDVRQVZH¶UHLQ
WKHPHVVZHDUH,WKLQN\¶NQRZ,WKLQN,¶GVD\ZH¶GJRDQGVWDUWIUHVKUHDOO\ 
Interviewer: :KDWLVWKHPHVVZH¶UHLQ" 
Caitlin,WKLQNZH¶YHJRWWRRPXFKGHEW 
 [Focus group A4] 
Interviewer: Why now? Why have the government suddenly decided that they 
want to save so much money? 
Felix:HOOWKHEDQNLQJLVVXHZDVDELJLVVXHZDVQ¶WLW 
Jilly: 7KH\¶UHVD\LQJLWZDVWKHGHEW 
Rose: The country is in debt. 
Felix«PLVDSSURSULDWLRQKDVJRQHVRPHKRZWKH\DUe responsible for that. 
Rose7KH\GRQ¶WOLNHXVEHLQJLQGHEWGRWKH\"7KH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶GRQ¶WOLNH
the country being in debt. 
 [Focus group B1] 
Mary: An interesting question [³what is the ³problem´ with the UK?´@,GRQ¶W
WKLQNWKHUH¶VDVLQJOH-word answer for it.  
Jo(YHU\WKLQJ7KDW¶VDVLQJOH-word answer.  
Laughter  
Mary: Debt is a problem.  
Jo: Yeah.  
Mary $QG \¶NQRZ >«@ ZKHWKHU \RX JR IURP LQGLYLGXDOV WR QDWLRQV WR WKH
JOREH'HEW LVDSUREOHP>«@>DQG@HVVHQWLDOO\\RXFXWEDFNRQVSHQGLQJEXW 
\RX KDYH WR GR VRPH VSHQGLQJ WR JHQHUDWH PRUH LQFRPH 6R LW¶V ILQGLQJ WKDW
EDODQFHLVQ¶WLW 
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 [Focus group B2] 
Identifying the problem of debt is significant in and of itself. This is for the simple 
reason that if one believes that debt is a problem, then one is likely to posit spending 
cuts as a way to pay what one owes as the logical solution. Participants used shared 
values to justify this, drawing on rules of thumb about the morality of debt and using 
experiences from managing household finances to make wider points about the state 
(for more on this, see Stanley, 2014). The process of identifying debt as a problem 
conferred a degree of legitimation in and of itself, due to the causal chain it created in 
the sociable public discourse produced by the groups. 
Once debt was established as a problem within the groups, attention shifted onto 
questioning how state had become indebted by debating various sources of profligacy. 
This was done implicitly rather than explicitly. It appeared at times as if participants 
were implicitly answering a question: assuming that we accept that the state must cut 
back to reduce debt, then we may naturally want to contemplate how and why the state 
managed to overspend in the first place. Welfare, bank bailouts, military spending were 
just a few of the reasons given by participants. One of the most common discussions, 
however, drew on experiences of state profligacy to make a point about the sources of 
state indebtedness. The comments from Rose, below, highlight this: 
Rose: <HDK9RWH/DERXU7KH\¶UHJLYLQJPRQH\DZD\ OHIW ULJKWDQGFHQWUH
/HW¶V JLYH \RX VRPHEHFDXVH \RXKDYHQ¶W JRW D MRE DQG OHW¶V JLYH \RX VRPH
EHFDXVH \RX¶YH JRW  NLGV $QG WKH QH[W NLG VRPH WRR EHFDXVH \RX¶YH MXVW
DUULYHGLQWKHFRXQWU\DQGZHIHHOVRUU\IRU\RX<RXFDQ¶W MXVWJRRXWJLYLQJ
money to everybody. 
  [Focus group B5] 
There was a sense, especially in the B groups, that the state ³gives money away´ in an 
unsystematic, arbitrary, and unfair manner.  
Similar to this was the relatively more nuanced sense that public money is being 
misspent. As opposed to ³free money´, these discussions, which chiefly took place in 
the A groups, were more squarely focused on the illogical banalities of state profligacy 
that are apparent in everyday life. The example below is particularly illustrative, 
because it was in response to a question about controversies over local spending cuts. 
The logic behind the question is that it would invite participants to discuss struggles in 
the local area, opening up space to discuss struggles on a more national level. That this 
was purposefully interpreted in this way, is interesting: 
Nicholas: I would be the opposite. I would say my controversy is spending 
money round here on the roads, throwing money around ± DQG ,¶P WKLQNLQJ
what are they doing that? 
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Duncan: 2QVWUHHWOLJKWV«RU«" 
Nicholas: Well, jusW RQ« WKDW EXVLQHVV GRZQ WKHUH WRZDUGV 0DQRU URDG DQG
WRZDUGV\RXUURDGWKHUH¶VDEULGJH$QGWKH\¶YHSXWWKDWWKH\¶YHH[WHQGHGWKH
SDYHPHQW:KDWKDYHWKH\GRQHIRU",¶YHJRWQRLGHD 
  [Focus group A2] 
This reflected similar discussions about the wasteful practices of state spending that 
took place in all the A groups.  
These example discussions of state profligacy tell us three things about how the 
participants¶ sense-making processes confer a degree of legitimation onto austerity 
measures. First, given that these discussions almost always followed from identifying 
debt as a problem, these discussions implicitly justified austerity measures by 
identifying areas of wasteful state spending. Second, these anecdotes can be used to 
excuse and justify the potentially harmful consequences ± whatever they may be ± of 
reluctantly accepting spending cuts. If one makes the connection between state 
indebtedness (and thus overspending) and inefficiency and profligacy, then it gives the 
sense of something palpable and relatively harmless to be cut. Third, these discussions 
suggest that the narratives surrounding austerity give sense to concrete experiences of 
the public. Experiences in which public money is deemed to have been wasted ³stick´ 
and later help make sense of, and to an extent confirm, stories of state indebtedness and 
overspending. Given that what is being accessed in the focus groups is not individual 
subjective beliefs but sociable public discourse from two disparate sub-groups that 
justifies austerity on the basis of shared cultural resources, it is plausible to describe 
this everyday narrative as (ideal-)typical. Taken together, this shows one way in which 
a degree of legitimacy is conferred onto the austerity programme.  
&RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV 
This article has outlined a methodology for using focus groups to study everyday 
narratives in world politics. Although adopting this methodology involves making 
ostensibly radical epistemic assumptions in contrast to the conventional wisdom, it has 
a number of advantages. The methodology ± consisting of a Weberian approach to the 
nature of knowing and being, and more substantive theoretical claims about 
intersubjectivity ± aligns particularly well with the sociable public discourse generated 
by the focus group method. The focus on legitimation, meanwhile, ensures that the 
methodology can analyse everyday narratives while still contributing to debates about 
elite-driven political change. This methodology is just one way to use focus groups in 
political science and IR. It is not necessarily the most useful approach, as that will 
depend on the nature of the research being undertaken. Yet, the article argues that the 
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general epistemic moves made by this methodology should at least be considered and 
reflected upon if political scientists are to get the most from focus groups. Indeed, 
doing so is essential to ensure focus groups are considered a primary research method 
in and of itself.  
If there is a wider point to take from this article it is this: think critically about methods 
and methodology, because there is no need to involuntarily accept or instrumentally 
acquiesce to orthodox positions. There are now numerous accounts that encourage 
political scientists and IR scholars to reflect upon the ontological choices we make (e.g. 
Hay, 2002; Jackson, 2010). Although these philosophical interventions have been 
productive, it is also important to similarly reflect on actual methods of data collection 
and analysis. In particular, political scientists should consider what type of knowledge 
they wish to generate when conducting interviews of any sort (whether, for instance, 
WKH\ZLVKWR³PLQH´RU³WUDYHO´DQGKRZWKDWNQRZOHGJHVKRXOGEHMXGJHGNQRZOHGJH
about ideal-type patterns are underpinned by a different logic to the methodology of 
quantitative public opinion research). If they decide that they are interested in 
interviewing to access a type of collective experience as opposed to personal beliefs, 
then I would encourage them to critically reflect on a number of radical epistemic 
choices this article has outlined. This is particularly the case when analysing everyday 
narratives in world politics. 
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$SSHQGL[ 
7DEOH$'HVFULSWLRQRIIRFXVJURXSSDUWLFLSDQWV 
Focus group A1. Kings Heath, Birmingham, May 2012. 
Name1  Age  Occupation 
Paul  51  Agricultural researcher 
Damien  47  English tutor 
Denise  52  Teaching assistant 
Maureen  52  Unemployed 
Waheed  52  Unknown 
Jerry  50  NHS manager 
Focus group A2. Sutton Coldfield, Birmingham, June 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Duncan  46  Banker 
Kyle  50  Driving instructor 
Linda  56  Housewife 
Nicholas  51  Car trader 
Focus group A3. Solihull, Birmingham, July 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Sarah  52  Child-minder 
Lucy  50  Part time sixth form lecturer / carer 
Rachel  51  IT support at local college 
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Focus group A4. Moseley, Birmingham, July 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Caitlin  48  Part time researcher and craftsperson 
Mandy  60  Retired teacher 
Michael  38  Broadcast journalist 
Focus group B5. Aston, Birmingham, September 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Lynn  46  Community organiser 
Felix  36  Unemployed / volunteer 
Jo  20  Volunteer 
Rose  42  Volunteer 
Linda  N/A  Unknown 
Shauna  40  Events / community work 
Eric  58  Unknown 
Poonam  N/A  Retired 
Beemal  34  Unknown 
Jill  27  Mother 
Focus group B6. Shard End, Birmingham, October 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Joanna  N/A  Unknown 
Louise  37  Unknown 
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May  46  Care worker 
Jamie  18  College student 
Yangun  18  Retail assistant 
Jilly  30  Unknown 
Jo2  20  Volunteer 
Clare  N/A  Volunteer 
Mary  77  Retired 
Nicola  18  Student 
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1
 Names have been changed to ensure anonymity.  
2
 This participant appeared in two focus groups. 
